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ABSTRACT This article proposes a means for better understanding the self and
consciousness. Data indicate that the basic “emotional brain” continually computes
potential survival risk against reward to rank consequent “emotion scores” for all sen-
sory inputs.These scores compete to yield winner-takes-all outcomes that determine
the choice of attention or action.This mechanism prevails regardless of whether the
competing options gain their emotion scores through a rational or an intuitive path-
way. There is no need to postulate any homunculus or inner self in control of such
choice; indeed, our belief in a first-person self in overall control is wrong.The self is a
passive construct arising from each individual’s social development, where language
acquisition vastly heightens communication and awareness not only outwardly, but also
inwardly, as if to a controlling “inner I.” However, when society comes to hold the
maturing being accountable for his or her actions, the brain must respond, and it does
so in the only way it can, by deeming that this passive, inner self-construct act as if it
were the active self in charge. Consciousness emerges when the language-based output
of the higher brain is referred for ownership to this artificial self-construct.
Recently I was trying to explain to an intelligent woman the problem of trying to understand
how it is we perceive anything at all, and I was not having any success. She could not see why
there was a problem. Finally in despair I asked her how she herself thought she saw the world.
She replied that she probably had somewhere in her head something like a little television set.
“So who,” I asked “is looking at it?” She now saw the problem immediately.
—F. H. Crick (1979)
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OVER THE YEARS, I have come to the view that the brain, rather than themind, makes all decisions, just as it has done throughout our evolutionary
past. It does so unconsciously, and within that part of the brain representing the
basic bodily emotions (the “emotional brain” (Dalgleish 2004).This emotional
brain computes “values” (emotion scores) for each presenting option, based on
the estimated degree of risk/reward or cost/benefit the option presents to the
well-being of the organism. Although learned rational options and heuristic
rules of thumb can also compete in this “winner-takes-all” process, they can suc-
ceed only if their emotion score values surpass those of their more intuitive
risk/reward rivals.
This synthesis is in keeping with the emerging data on decision-making, par-
ticularly the studies of Kahneman (Kahneman 2002, 2011). It has the important
corollary that if the brain, and not the mind, makes the decisions, then the so-
called “hard problem” of the mind (Chalmers 1995) becomes a great deal easier:
the brain is in charge of itself.
Emotion Scoring of Sense Data
The emotional brain incorporates all those aspects of the brain concerned with
evaluating the basic emotions of reward and risk related to incoming sense data.
At the lowest level, this includes the amygdala (fear and arousal) and the mid-
brain striatal system (risk/reward) . At higher levels, it incorporates the orbito-
frontal cortex (OFC), the insula, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, and the an-
terior cingulate cortex (ACC), as well as other areas (Campbell 2007; Dalgleish
2004; Landreth and Bickle 2008; Preuschoff, Quartz, and Bossaerts 2008; Rush-
worth et al. 2007; Sugrue, Corrado, and Newsome 2005). These higher brain
regions are particularly important in the context of resolving choice ambiguity
(Quartz 2009; Rushworth and Behrens 2008)
Below, I outline my reasons for taking this perspective. I will then go on to
suggest that consciousness is indeed a secondary and delayed phenomenon, and
that the self is a social construct.The mechanism suggested in the first part of
the article allows the brain to be seen as autonomous without appealing to either
the transcendental “givenness” of consciousness in the phenomenological per-
spective or the infinite regression of higher-order representation theories of
consciousness philosophy (Drummond 2006; Moran 2005; Thompson 2011).
Instead, the brain is seen as self-controlling, even at the highest level: there is no
need for any homunculus, television set viewer, or other “controller.”
Attention and Decision Making
Emerging data suggests that the basic emotional responses of the brain can
automatically control attention and decision-making, at least of an “intuitive”
kind. Life has evolved an increasingly sophisticated and unconscious mechanism
for assessing the sensory input for potential threat or benefit to its survival or
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well-being.This mechanism is located in the part of the brain that relates to the
emotions. It converts the incoming sense data into a “common currency” for
evaluation, puts it into context, and then ranks the resulting “relative subjective
values” so as to allow disparate information to be compared (Glimcher 2009;
Montague and Berns 2002; Park et al. 2011).This results in winner-takes-all out-
comes. If no action is required, the highest score of the winner-takes-all “auc-
tion” determines what captures the brain’s immediate attention. But if there is
any hint of threat or benefit within the data, a process of “reward harvesting” or
“threat evaluation” ensues to define the best option for action, with that some-
times being the best of a bad lot (Blair et al. 2006; Campbell 2007; LeDoux
1998; Montague and King-Casas 2007).This decision and choice mechanism is
surprisingly precise, with reward and risk predictions being calculated quantita-
tively before optimal choices are made (Quartz 2009; Rushworth et al. 2007;
Sugrue,Corrado, and Newsome 2005). In addition, any differences between pre-
dicted and actual rewards and risks are used in feedback reinforcement, so that
the brain learns to improve subsequent predictions (Bayer and Glimcher 2005;
Niv and Schoenbaum 2008; Oyama et al. 2010; Preuschoff, Quartz, and Bos-
saerts 2008). The literature concerning this process is now well advanced, and
owes a great deal to neuroecomonics (Kable and Glimcher 2009; Landreth and
Bickle 2008; Rushworth andWalton 2009).The fields of cognitive science and
neuroscience have also been important, particularly in relation to evaluation and
choice action under conditions of uncertainty (Montague and King-Casas 2007;
Rushworth and Behrens 2008;Rushworth et al. 2007), but will not be discussed
further here. Suffice it to say that there is now fairly uniform agreement that
unconscious brain mechanisms are prominent in determining decision choice, at
least at an intuitive level.
Details of Mechanism
Of course, operation of the evaluation and choice system must be more com-
plex than outlined above. The following relatively small-print detail suggests
how it all might work in a neural network kind of way—albeit still rather sim-
plistically compared with the more mainstream literature in that field (Carpen-
ter, Grossberg, and Rosen 1991; Grossberg 2000).
Sensory data are seen as being processed in parallel with the responses they
evoke from the emotional brain system. By this view, ever-increasing levels of
the emotional brain dynamically compute quantitative emotion scores to all sen-
sory data on their way to optimal definition.At the lower emotional brain lev-
els, for example in the amygdala’s “alert/risk” and mid-brain striatal basic
“reward” systems, data with scores below a minimum threshold are seen as being
rejected, while any above the upper limit at any time capture the higher brain’s
immediate attention. Failing the latter, further emotion-scoring proceeds at
higher emotional brain levels (e.g., OFC evaluation and ACC choice systems;
Rushworth et al. 2007). These scores eventually compete at the highest emo-
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tional brain level to yield winner-takes-all outcomes. In the case of usual sen-
sory data inputs, that process determines what comes to the higher brain’s imme-
diate attention.Where some action is required, the evaluative process includes a
quantitative computational risk-benefit analysis of the various options before the
final choice is made.
The prevailing maximum and minimum thresholds outside which outputs
lead to action and rejection respectively are seen as varying with time, being
determined by, among other factors, motivational drives reflecting basic biolog-
ical needs. If at any time none of the available options comes to exceed the set
maximum, the system lowers that threshold to allow a brief focus on the best
available, while at the same time reverting from attention to reorientation-and-
search mode until a more suitable contender is found (Carpenter, Grossberg, and
Rosen 1991; Grossberg 2000). Of course, at any time such a search may reveal a
totally new item of interest, or otherwise some new motivational drive may re-
place the old, in which case the whole system is launched in a new direction.
Such analyses are held to apply to all levels of sensory processing, regardless
of whether the input is derived from an external source, generated internally by
reference to the various memory networks, or conditioned from above by a vari-
ation in higher-brain top-down context.The suggested minimum cut-off emo-
tion score threshold ensures that the competition process is not impeded by the
unnecessary inclusion of trivial data. Memory traces of remaining data, between
the minimum and maximum thresholds, are seen as being retained for a time,
allowing them to remain competitive with any new data arising from a switch
of the system from attention to reorientation-and-search mode. Clearly, within
this whole mechanism, only one winner-takes-all outcome can capture the focus
of attention at any one time. Nonetheless, others above the current maximum
emotion score threshold may evoke pre-attentive processing and action, this time
subliminally, as when the hands steer automatically while the main focus is on
the road.
The nature of the emotions involved in this process are decided by the emo-
tion-scoring risk/reward system itself. This system could yield a score over a
scale of, say, +100 to –100, depending on the degree of computed potential
reward/punishment. Sometimes the outcome would entail accepting the lesser
of two evils (Blair et al. 2006; Campbell 2007). Because the emotional brain is
quite capable of learning dynamically (Bayer and Glimcher 2005), the whole
emotion scoring process can become increasingly more sophisticated with the
individual’s positive and negative experiences over time.
In a sense, this system can be seen as a mechanism for registering basic plea-
sure or displeasure, learned or otherwise, but always with the proviso that these
terms are restricted to their pre-attentive manifestations within the emotional
brain. Social emotions such as joy or sadness are not viewed as being primarily
involved here, at least not in their conscious manifestations (see further below).
Just what neural network mechanisms might implement such a process
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remains undetermined. However, there are certainly good examples of success-
ful winner-takes-all mechanisms in artificial neural networks, so the whole
process is much more than a theoretical possibility (Carpenter, Grossberg, and
Rosen 1991; Grossberg 2000).
The Emotional Brain and Rationality
The reader may, of course, interject that this whole process is all very well for
unconscious, almost reflex, survival mechanisms, but it does not really help ex-
plain the situation in humans, with our highly developed capacity for rational
thought. However, the intuitive emotional brain is still likely to contribute in
some way in humans. Damasio’s (1994) somatic marker hypothesis holds that
intuitive or emotional “gut feelings” act as a biasing device to reduce the num-
ber of options competing for rational consideration, rather like the pre-selection
process for a competition final. But the evidence is now against this. Nobel lau-
reate Daniel Kahneman and his colleagues have shown that there are indeed two
systems involved in decision-making in man, equivalent to the intuitive and the
rational (Kahneman 2002, 2011). Surprisingly, though, the intuitive system
strongly dominates. De Neys and Glumicic (2008) have now found that this is
not because of any lack of due (unconscious) deliberation over rational options,
but because the rational options somehow do not carry enough “weight” to
overcome the intuitive.
Kahneman’s (2011) suggestion is that the two systems for decision-making
work as follows. System 1 is automatic, intuitive and fast, even impulsive, while
System 2 is deliberative, slow, rational, and controlled.However, I regard the intu-
itive process as being more in line with the views of Damasio (1994)—in other
words, dominated by the emotional “gut feelings” that arise from the body’s emo-
tional brain. Also, Kahneman includes heuristic rules of thumb as an important
part of intuitive system 1.This seems sound, not because of any intrinsic “emo-
tional value” such rules of thumb possess within that system, but because experi-
ence over time soon gives them such values, and so allows them to compete with
the more intuitively based emotion-scored options. Most importantly, the same
can be said of rational options, where experience can serve precisely the same
end. The problem there, however, is that rationality and logic are relative late-
comers on the evolutionary stage, and correspondingly seem to have [problems]
difficulty getting through to the emotional evaluation system to obtain compet-
itive emotional scores.This is particularly the case with [statistical and probability
arguments] probability and statistical problems (Kahneman 2011).
Option Weighting
To understand how rational options might be “weighted” against the intuitive
to sometimes gain the upper hand, I suggest the following hypothesis:
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Rational options are chosen if, and only if, the emotion scores they evoke from the evalua-
tive risk/reward system of the emotional brain are high enough to out-compete their more
intuitive rivals.
Rational options evoke those emotion scores by prevailing at times when little
else appeals, by analogy with some previous experience, or when suggested by
trusted or experienced others. As a simple example, when a child realizes from
some previous experience that putting one box on top of another can allow her
to reach a desirable but otherwise unobtainable piece of fruit, she might expe-
rience such reward, and with it the “feeling” of the great joy and pleasure in dis-
covery. A successful option like this would then be given a correspondingly high
emotion score, and no doubt be tucked away in the memory banks for use in
some analogous situation in future. Much learning from experience might be
involved in attaining such rational options and heuristic rules of thumb, but the
present view holds that, in the end, they will only be useful in reaching decisions
if they have enough “appeal” to the emotional brain system to outbid their more
intuitive rivals. Put another way, whether we like it or not, we are disposed to
choosing rational options only insofar as they are judged to be potentially more
emotionally rewarding than their intuitive rivals—in essence, only if they “feel”
better.
Relevant to this point, Damasio (1994) has demonstrated that damage to the
ventro-medial prefrontal cortex can cause difficulty in making even simple deci-
sions. This is interpreted here as being due to a problem of getting rational
options or heuristic rules of thumb back down to the evaluation/reward system
to obtain any sort of competitive emotion-score.
Of course, with time and experience within a social world, learned emo-
tions—like shame on the one hand, or bravery on the other—may sometimes
facilitate sufficiently high emotional scores to sway the decision. However, the
important factor is what registers within the emotional brain, rather than in any
conscious manifestation. Similarly, individual members of a highly organized
society may allow some basic emotion-score predisposition to be overridden by
societal mores or the respected views of others (Saxe and Haushofer 2008). But
the final decision is still seen as being made within the emotion-scoring system
described.
Coexistence and competition of the rational with the intuitive like this may
seem odd, but it would explain De Ney and Glumicic’s (2008) results, and it is
also in keeping with Glimcher’s (2009) findings that there is no apparent divi-
sion of the brain areas into rational and emotional subgroups. So overall, “The
emotional tail wags the rational dog” (Kahneman 2011, p. 140). In effect, the
senses can be seen as merely providing the organism with a means of evaluating
the environment with respect to the organism’s well-being. By this synthesis, we
humans are just like all other creatures: forever pre-attentively trawling the nat-
ural world for something that might satisfy our needs, and sometimes settling on
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a rational option if it is analogous to something of previous appeal, while all the
time remaining wary of any threat the environment might portend. The only
difference between the present view and that of Kahneman is that here the intu-
itive or emotional system always prevails, notwithstanding that heuristics and
rational options may emerge from it if they have sufficient emotional appeal.
If this much is accepted, at least as a possibility, then something very impor-
tant follows in relation to the mind-body problem—namely, that this could be
the mechanism we seek as the controller of higher-brain deliberations. In this
model, the brain functions autonomously on the basis of the evaluation and
choice mechanisms afforded it by the risk/reward system, perhaps more sophis-
ticatedly in higher species, but always at an unconscious and essentially intuitive
level.There is now no need to postulate some mysterious “ghost in the machine”
as controller in charge, and the problem of “uncaused causes” pales into insignif-
icance (Baumeister, Masicampo, and Vohs 2011; Ryle 1949).Attention and cog-
nition are both determined by this evaluative risk/reward system.
Some readers may take exception to the model presented here.“Regardless of
whether and how rational options feed into the evaluation/reward system for
decision-making,” they may object,“this is ultimately all sleight of hand.We are
selves in overall conscious control of all we perceive, believe, think, intend and
do, and can readily accept or veto any decision put forward from any such basic
emotional brain level!”Well, in my view it’s not that simple, and I will now con-
sider possible ways that consciousness and an apparently controlling self may be
explained in the light of the emotional brain.
Consciousness as a Late State of Brain Activity
It is not at all necessary to hold that we are active selves in conscious control.
Consciousness is actually a latecomer on the stage of any individual’s prevailing
brain activity. In particular, it is now well established that consciousness of an
urge to move at any one particular time is preceded by brain activity for at least
half a second (Libet 1985).This controversial finding has been confirmed in
many studies, most recently and most importantly using single neuron record-
ings within the human medial frontal cortex (Fried, Mukamel, and Kreiman
2011; Haggard 2005; Haggard, Newman, and Magno 1999; Kühn and Brass
2009; Soon et al. 2008;Wegner 2003). There are those who object that such
activity is merely “cranking up” the brain as a necessary prelude to the complex
act of a conscious urge (Baumeister, Masicampo, and Vohs 2011). But this begs
the question of just who or what is initiating this preliminary activity, and hence
leaves the mind-body problem as starkly unanswered as ever.And suggesting that
the unconscious and conscious brain somehow act together gets us no further.
Others would have it that unconscious brain activity holds only for volition,
but sensory perception can also be truly unconscious, as in blindsight, where the
patient is blind to normal vision yet can still react to a visual motion input with
appropriate motor responses (Brogaard 2011; Goodale and Milner 1992). More
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cogently, Libet again has shown that neural cortical activity of at least 500 msec
duration is necessary before subjects can become aware of a sensory stimulus
applied to the skin (Libet et al. 1979). And we know that quite complex deci-
sions can be made entirely unconsciously (Bargh and Chartrand 1999; Dijkster-
huis et al. 2006; Persaud, McLeod, and Cowey 2007).
Culture, Language, and the Self
Philosophers recognize two sorts of selves, the bodily self, or “self-as-object,” and
the first-person self, the “inner I” actively in charge of everything, the “self-as-
subject.” I suggest that this first-person self-as-subject is not at all actively in
charge of volition, attention, and decision-making in the way we so profoundly
believe. Instead, culture and language play the major role in development of the
self-as-subject and in our illusion that it has primacy of control.
The Emergence of the First-Person Self
We humans have gradually evolved to become highly social beings, well de-
scribed as “relational selves,” now existing and developing within a rich social
context (Andersen and Chen 2002;Maclaren 2008). Even before the individual’s
acquisition of speech, basic bodily communication with caregivers allows each
infant to recognize that humans are very different from other animate and inan-
imate entities. This, together with the infant’s ability to imitate using “mirror
neurons” and other shared neural circuits, promotes the discovery of a certain
“me-like-him-ness” and with that, the development of a self-as-object concept,
a process greatly enhanced by members of society referring to their own and
their infants’ identities as “selves,” or some such pre-speech equivalent (Eilan,
Marcel, and Burmundez 1995; Iacoboni 2003;Meltzoff and Moore 1995;Uddin
et al. 2007).
Once he gets a grasp of language, the child gradually comes to understand
that just as he can communicate with other “selves” externally, so too can he
now converse, internally and silently, with what he naturally comes to regard as
an inner self. Now, I hold that this latter is a mere passive concept. Nonetheless,
as the child obtains an increasing comprehension of language and cultural val-
ues, there eventually comes a time when society expects him, as a maturing
being, to be accountable for his beliefs and actions, as if he indeed possessed an
active self-as-subject in charge. As we have seen, however, there is no need to
postulate such an active self in control when the brain’s higher output is deter-
mined by the competitive risk/reward evaluation and emotion-scoring system
described. Regardless of this, and given increasing societal pressure, the individ-
ual must respond to the challenge, and the child does so in the only way he
can—by unwittingly allowing the brain’s passive inner self construct to act as if
it were the active self-as-subject in control. Again though, because the brain is
its own agent, the apparently active nature of the newly deemed self-as-subject
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is illusory. There is no inner active self experiencing and driving thought and
behaviour, just a passive inner self concept to which the higher brain’s commu-
nicable output is now referred to make it seem so.
This crucial point bears reiteration: what I am suggesting is that a passive in-
ner self gradually becomes established within the brain essentially as a societal con-
struct. Although it is passive, the social context in which the inner self is formed
means that the individual must develop a strong sense of actually having an active
inner self at the very core of his or her being, a subjective self that appears to own
all thought and experience, an inner “I” in charge. Once that is established, all of
the higher brain’s communicable output is naturally referred to this self-construct
for “ownership,” so that the individual comes to have the unshakeable illusion of
being a self in control of everything, a state about which it appears impossible to
be mistaken, even on deepest introspection (Shoemaker 1968).
Consciousness
The acquisition of society’s communication skills (overwhelmingly language) is
vital to establishing yet another layer of higher human brain functioning: con-
sciousness. My basic premise is that what comes to the attention of the higher
brain comes only after it has competed successfully within the emotion-score
evaluation process. Then, provided it can be couched in communicable terms,
(again, largely linguistic), it naturally comes to be owned by the individual, who
now has the belief that he or she is in control of everything as an active self-as-
subject.Then we have the self with consciousness, the first-person subjective self
we know so well.
For a human being to achieve her maximum potential awareness of the out-
side world, she must learn the language communication skills of the cultural
group. This gives her a very sophisticated means of processing information to
describe and understand the world, instilling, for example, names for various
entities, and a grasp of the value of models and metaphors in coming to terms
with difficult new concepts (Lakoff 1987; Sellars 1997). Once the first-person
self-as-subject entity has been constructed, the individual is in possession of a
robust sense of an active inner “I.” It then becomes natural for this construct to
appear to own all of the higher brain language-based output.And I suggest that
when this happens, that output becomes what we call consciousness. It then ap-
pears certain to us that we are a true active inner self in charge of the stream of
consciousness, the very homunculus watching the television screen.
Consciousness is thus seen as being essentially an emergent feature of the
grounding of all language-based higher-brain output in the constructed self-as-
subject. It is in reality a state of awareness of the world, but an awareness so
heightened over that of non-linguistic creatures that it is deemed here to war-
rant the separate term, consciousness.At whatever level, the more society and the
world are experienced and learned over time via communication, linguistic or
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otherwise, the more awareness—or, in our case consciousness—each individual
attains.
From this perspective, neither consciousness nor the self-as-subject plays any
role in the creation of active inner thought. They are entirely secondary and
non-causal phenomena resulting from higher-brain activity, the effect and not
the cause of the way the world becomes known, of how the individual comes
to be “with knowledge,” or con-scious.
Language
The general perspective that consciousness is dependent on language is not new.
According to Sellars (1997), “all awareness of sorts, resemblances, facts etc., in
short, all awareness of abstract entities—indeed, all awareness even of particu-
lars—is a linguistic affair” (p. 63, original italics). Sellars held that perception is
ultimately totally reliant on language to give it meaning. It is as if we start out
in life with a non-view of the world, and only learn about it when we come to
understand names and concepts given to its various entities or situations by oth-
ers. Even so, he holds that in our early learning we remain unwilling to say more
than “X looks red and triangular,” rather than “X is red and triangular,” until our
statements are endorsed by the reports of more reliable and more linguistically
skilled members of the community.The present synthesis is entirely consistent
with that. Implicit here also is that self-awareness and introspection are closely
related to language as “inner speech” (Werning 2010).
The philosopher Daniel Dennett (1991) also holds that language is essential
to consciousness, though the precise nature of the “probe” that samples his on-
going narrative “Multiple Drafts” within the brain to create the conscious state
is not at all clear.
Free Will
What then of free will? Consciousness as a proposed secondary event in the
brain should actually not cause real concern.Our brains are highly sophisticated,
avidly learning to encompass all of our knowledge and experience, and embrac-
ing all of our emotions, ambitions, wisdom, and concepts, including our beliefs
about freedom, ethics, and morality. Our neural network connections are of the
greatest intricacy,more than sufficient to the task of solving the myriad complex
problems put before them.And it is becoming increasingly clear that a great deal
of this brain activity, even in complex decision-making, is carried out at a level
below consciousness (Bargh and Chartrand 1999; Beilock et al. 2002; Dijkster-
huis et al. 2006; van Gaal et al. 2010). Moreover now, when those pre-conscious
options can be seen as vying for higher brain attention through competitive
emotion-scoring, there is no longer any need to postulate an underlying self-
conscious subject in charge to determine attention.What I am suggesting is that
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evaluative and pre-attentive brain processes determine our will, not conscious-
ness. Free will comes entirely from unconscious brain mechanisms, and neither
an inner self-as-subject nor consciousness is in control. In effect, the end falsifies
the means, and it only seems that a conscious inner self is in charge. It might now
even be said, after Voltaire, that “If an active inner conscious self did not exist,
the human brain would find it necessary to invent it.”
Consciousness, Awareness,
and Intentionality
Human consciousness is regarded as a matter of degree. In any individual, the
greater the grasp of the language, knowledge, and cultural mores, the higher the
level of consciousness. Moreover, though consciousness is not usually attributed
to nonhuman creatures, the corollary is that in them, as in pre-speech infants,
consciousness or what we might call a lesser “awareness” is also a matter of quan-
tity at any one time, and proportional to the individual’s current mastery of the
communication skills of the species or cultural group as a whole (through touch,
pheromones, utterances, song, bodily gestures, etc.). At a minimum, this must be
sufficient to give the individual a capacity for basic social interaction, as well as
the development of a rudimentary sense of self-as-subject therefrom (Reddy
2003). Such elementary creature awareness might reasonably be regarded as min-
imal consciousness, but it is so small in comparison with that attained by linguis-
tically skilled humans that it is here assigned to the separate category,“awareness.”
The grounding of the brain’s communicable output in the artificially con-
structed self-as-subject creates a firm a sense of ownership of its contents, and
that allows us to grasp the essence of our subjectivity, albeit in a rather strange
way. It also provides a means of understanding so-called intentionality, or the way
mental phenomena seem necessarily to be “about” or “directed upon” objects,
real or imaginary (Brentano 1973; Siewert 2006).
The related term qualia refers to the subjective qualities of conscious experi-
ences, or their “feel” to the individual, as in the pain of a headache, the taste of
a wine, or the rich redness of an evening sky. Such subjective “raw feels” would
seem to imply at least some emotional aspect to the experience. If all higher-
brain output realized in consciousness is essentially “emotion-score gated,” it
would seem natural for conscious mental states to contain that emotional qual-
ity as part of their character.
Of course, many would hold that qualia represent more than mere qualitative
emotional value, as implied by the associated term “phenomenal consciousness,”
where the “something it is like” to experience conscious thoughts is generally
taken to relate to the ability to access, introspectively, some more fundamental
aspect of our mental lives (Tye 2007).The perspective taken here is that this in
fact largely reflects our ability to learn to use the sensory organs for the purposes
of perception. The congenitally blind when given new sight, and Jackson’s
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“Mary,” no less than the developing child, must all learn to construct their real-
ity from the sensory input in order to perceive, with even simple sensory inputs
being initially quite meaningless and entirely without qualia (Jackson 1986;
Piaget 1954; Sacks 1995).
Such learning requires a long apprenticeship, including the attainment of sen-
sorimotor skills in interaction with the environment, the ability to combine the
various sensory modalities—of color, form, hue, shadow, space, movement—into
a meaningful visual whole, and, most of all, the acquisition of language to
describe and understand the world (McGann 2010; O’Regan and Noe 2001;
Sellars 1997). In short, we must gain experience before we can experience.
Bringing experience to consciousness requires the brain to communicate its
grasp of the percept to the first-person self-as-subject construct, so providing it
with a firm sense of ownership.The “me-ness,” or “what it is like for me”of phe-
nomenal consciousness, is precisely what one expect from that process.
Conclusion
We differ from computers in two important respects: in having a biological drive
for survival, and in having a highly developed mechanism for inter-subjective
discourse within society.These functions are subserved by the emotional brain’s
risk/reward evaluation system, and by language communication, respectively.
The former determines what comes to final attention and cognition, while the
latter confers on the individual a high order of knowledge and awareness of the
world, as well as a strong sense of self. Passive as this self entity actually is, it
comes to be regarded by the individual in society as the essence of his or her
active inner self-as-subject, which thereby comes to own all of the brain’s lan-
guage-based content.The individual is then a self with knowledge, and what we
call consciousness is secondary to that.
The hypothesis outlined here is not meant to provide a comparison with the
many theories of consciousness, except where relevant. Suffice it to say that no
theory—whether based on the neural correlates of consciousness, information
processing, intentionality, phenomenology, higher-order representation, theoret-
ical modeling, neural workspace models, sensorimotor contingency theories,
introspection of “lived experience,” “embodied cognition,” or other views—is
yet sufficient (Baars 1988;Chalmers 1995;Crick and Koch 2003;Damasio 1999;
De Preester 2007; Degenaar and Keijzer 2009; Dehaene and Naccache 2001;
Droege 2005; Edelman andTononi 2000; Ingram 2002; Legrand 2007;O’Regan
et al. 2001; Petit 2007; Petitmengin 2009; Siewert 2006; Thagard and Aubie
2008;Thompson 2011;Tononi 2008;Tye 2007; Zahavi 2007). As Tsuchiya and
Adolphs (2007) remark:“Future work requires not only more data but also fur-
ther theoretical development of concepts . . .” (p. 158). It is to this latter end, and
from a fairly broad perspective (Boyd 2012), that the present manuscript is
addressed.
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